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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of central bank independence on in
ation per-
sistence. Our theoretical analysis predicts that a higher degree of central bank
independence leads to a lower in
ation persistence and therefore to a higher speed
of disin
ation. The empirical results, provided using a 18 OECD countries sample,
show that central bank independence is negatively related to the degree of in
ation
persistence. In addition, as there is a positive correlation between in
ation persis-
tence and the sacrice ratio, we conclude that central bank independence, through
its in
uence on in
ation persistence, is negatively correlated to the sacrice ratio.
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Introduction
The last decade witnessed a wave of changes towards central bank reforms in a number of
countries, especially in the European Union. The main factor behind those central bank
reforms was the belief that the independence of the central bank is an ecacious device for
achieving low in
ation and price stability. Indeed, many economists argue that Central
Bank Independence (CBI), with a clear mandate to maintain price stability, may be an
institutional mechanism through which the credibility of government commitments can
be enhanced, raising thus the probability of the success of disin
ationary policies through
the change of the private sector in
ationary expectations.
However, recent empirical studies investigating the relationship between CBI and dis-
in
ation costs (see, Debelle and Fischer, 1994; Walsh, 1994; Fischer, 1996; Gaertner,
1997; Jordan,1997; and Baltensperger and Kugler, 2000) report evidence that higher CBI
implies higher disin
ation costs. To rationalize these empirical ndings, appearing some-
what surprising, a variety of explanations have been suggested. One of the most usual
explanations (see for example Walsh, 1994) lies in the in
uence of CBI on the output-
in
ation tradeo (i.e. the slope of the Phillips curve). As stated by the well established
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1empirical result of Alesina and Summers (1993), CBI produces, on average, lower and less
variable in
ation. This, in turn, can lead to less frequent price and wage adjustments
and, therefore, to a 
atter short-run Phillips curve and higher disin
ation costs (Lucas,
1973; Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988; and Jordan, 1997). Therefore, with a credible
commitment to low in
ation and price stability, indexation and short period contracts
may become less prevalent, leading to more wage and price persistence.
Regardless of how convincing we consider such an explanation, it has to be pointed
out that the speed of disin
ation represents another important factor in
uencing the
sacrice ratio1. Actually, the optimal speed of disin
ation (that is the choice between
\gradualism" and \cold turkey") is a central issue for macroeconomic policy. According to
Sargent (1983), disin
ation is less costly if it is quick. He argues that a sharp regime-shift
produces credibility, and hence expectations adjust sharply making disin
ation costless.
Ball (1994) nds, across his sample of disin
ation episodes using cross-country data,
that the speed of disin
ation is inversely related to the size of the sacrice ratios. In
other words, he nds that a fast disin
ation, a so-called \cold turkey" procedure, leads
to smaller sacrice ratios. Moreover, as noted by Cukierman (1992, p.273), in
ation is
usually a fairly persistent process. The speed at which the economy reacts to a change in
its environment may be slow and the economy may not move quickly to a new equilibrium
with lower price expectations. In this respect, the way economic agents perceive major
changes in the policy regime (such as CBI) has important implications for the short-run
impact of policy changes.
For these reasons, we focus in this paper on the in
uence of institutional rules, such as
the CBI, on the degree of in
ation persistence and therefore on the speed of disin
ation
and on the size of the disin
ation costs. Recently, Jordan (1997, 1999) investigated the
relationship between CBI and the speed of disin
ation. He suggested that the speed
of disin
ation is connected to CBI and a lower degree of CBI leads to fast disin
ation.
According to Jordan (1999), both the non linear form of the Phillips curve and the size
of the total disin
ation cause this phenomenon. With a low degree of CBI, the short-
run Phillips curve is steeper and total disin
ation is large. The disin
ation process can
be faster because the output loss is small. However, in his framework the degree of
in
ation persistence is exogenous and not aected by the degree of CBI. The purpose
of this paper is to add to the literature by examining the way in which CBI aects the
degree of in
ation persistence and therefore the speed of disin
ation. We rst formulate
a theoretical model which suggests that CBI and nominal wage indexation reduce the
persistence of in
ation and thereby increase the speed of disin
ation (which is negatively
related to the disin
ation costs). We then provide some empirical evidence to test our
theoretical results. These empirical ndings support our theoretical results showing that
CBI is associated with lower in
ation persistence and higher speed of disin
ation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical frame-
work. Section 3 discuss how the central bank independence is related to the speed of
disin
ation (through its in
uence on the in
ation persistence) and thus to the disin
ation
costs. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions
of the paper.
1A variety of additional factors such as the degree of nominal rigidities, the labor market characteris-
tics, or the openness of an economy have been also taken into account (see, Ball, 1994).
21 The theoretical framework
This section provides a simple theoretical game model to frame our analysis. Our objective
is not to provide an exhaustive description of the role of the CBI, but rather to show that
our results are consistent with the implication of highly stylized model in monetary policy.
For our purpose, we consider a simple one-period Barro-Gordon [1983] model of monetary
policy extended to allow for stochastic shocks and indexed wage contracts (see Gray [1976]
and Fischer [1983]). Capital will be assumed xed in the short-run, and output is given
by the short-run production of the type:
yt = lt + t (1)
where yt is the logarithm of output, lt is the logarithm of employment,  is the exponent
of labor and is less than unity (0 <  < 1) and t is a supply side shock (or productivity
shock) which is assumed to follow the process:
t = gy + t 1 + t (2)
where gy is the deterministic growth rate of output (or productivity), the parameter 
(0 <  < 1) determines the degree of autocorrelation in productivity shocks, and t is
a normally distributed shock with zero mean and a variance varying with  so as to
standardize the variance of t at 2







employment by equalizing the marginal product of labor to the real wage. This yealds
the following employment demand function:
l
d
t =  + [1=(1   )](pt   wt + t) (3)
where  = ln()=(1   ) > 0, wt is the logarithm of the nominal wage, pt is the log of
price level in time t. The labor supply by workers is given by:
l
s
t =     + (pt   wt);  > 0 (4)
where the intercept term in (4) is not set equal to that of the demand for labor because
we assume that the labor supply is aected by distortions factors in the labor market,
captured by the parameter  ( > 0)2. Equating (3) and (4) under the assumption that
 = 0, without any loss of generality of our results, we obtain:
b wt = pt + t + (1   ) (5)
where b wt is the competitive equilibrium nominal wage in the labor market that would
arise in the absence of nominal wage contracts and leads to the following competitive
equilibrium output level: b yt = y k+t, where y = ; and k = . Once wage contracts
are signed at the beginning of each period, employment becomes demand determined.
2These distortions are assumed to be the result of either the income tax policies, or \insiders" behavior
in the labor market which leads to an excessive base real wage.
3Thus, a moral hazard problem arise, justifying the incentive of workers to index their
nominal wages to unexpected price movements (see, Gray, 1976) following the indexing
rule:
wt = Et 1 b wt + 
(pt   Et 1pt); 1 > 
 > 0 (6)
where Et 1 is the rational expectation operator and 
 is the indexing parameter. For

 = 1, wages are fully indexed, for 
 = 0 are no indexed and for 0 < 
 < 1 are partially
indexed. Finally, integrating the equation (6) into (3) and using (1), we obtain the
following aggregate supply function:
yt = y   k + (1   
)(t   Et 1t) + (1 + )t (7)
where  ( pt   pt 1) is the in
ation rate and  = =(1   ).
















In other words, the government dislikes deviations from both his in
ation target, (assumed
to be zero for simplicity) and his output target, y
t (expressed in percentage points above
natural output: y
t = b yt + k > 0). The preference parameter  ( > 0) denotes the
relative importance that government places on the output target and the in
ation tar-
get. Since the government has no credible commitment technology available, it selects in
the head of the central bank a \conservative" central banker by being more concerned
about in
ation that the government (see, Rogo, 1985). This central banker minimizes













; 0 <  < 1 (9)
Equation (9) indicates that the central banker is the policymaker setting the in
ation rate
t to achieve the targeted in
ation and output outcomes. The government decides about
the degree of the central banker conservatism denoted by the parameter . Since  is
strictly greater than zero, the central banker places a greater relative weight on in
ation
stabilization than government does. In the following, we assume that no distinction is
made between independence and conservatism3.
Consider a one-shot Nash equilibrium. The central banker sets his policy instrument
t in order to minimize the expected value of the loss function (9), taking e
t and t 1
as given, and after observing the current-period supply shock. The private sector forms
its rational expectations about in
ation before observing the current-period shock t and
before the policymaker sets the in
ation rate. The time-consistent rational expectations

















3For an extensive discussion, see Eijnger and De Haan (1996)
4Equation (10) reveals that the equilibrium in
ation rate in each period is determined by
three factors: (1   
)(k   gy)=(1 + ) is the permanent in









ation due to output
stabilization in the present period, 
2(1 
)t 1=(1 + ) is the temporary in
ationary
bias due to past stabilization policy. The presence of the variable t 1 shows that equation
(2) is an alternative and simpler way of introducing in
ation persistence (see Bleaney
[2001]).
2 CBI and the speed of disin
ation
In this section, we focus on the eect of CBI on the speed of disin
ation through its in
u-
ence on the degree of in
ation persistence. This persistence, measured by the correlation





We now determine the variance of t and the covariance of t and t 1. The uncon-
ditional mean of the in






Equation (12)indicates that higher CBI (higher ) reduces the average in
ation rate.
Using equations (10) and (12), the unconditional variance of the in























To obtain now the covariance of the in
ation rates t and t 1, we use equation (10)















1 +  + 
2(1   
)2t 1 (14)
From equations (10) and (14), and assuming that E (t 1t 1) = E (tt 1) = 0, we
can dene the covariance between t and t 1 as 4:










4Note that the unconditional mean of t 1 is also equal to .
5Finally, using equations (11), (13) and (15), the correlation coecient  between the
in
ation rates t and t 1 which measures the degree of in
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Equation (17) provides the major new result of this paper. It states that where the degree
of CBI is greater, the degree of in
ation persistence is lower, ceteris paribus. Moreover,
equation (18) indicates that nominal wage indexation also negatively aects the degree
of in
ation persistence.
Finally, the speed of disin
ation can be related to the degree of in
ation persistence,
. Theoretically, the disin
ation process lasts an innitely long time. However, for a
meaningful determination of the speed of disin
ation, the innite process has to be cut
o. Consequently, we compute the absolute speed of disin
ation, s, as the size of the
disin
ation between t   1 and t (see, Jordan 1999):
s = t 1   t (19)
Starting from a situation with an initial in
ation t 1 equal to its mean , and assuming
that the in
ation rate follows an AR(1) process: t =  t 1; where  is the correlation
coecient (or degree of in
ation persistence), we can write:


















where it is assumed that the average in
ation rate  is considered as given when policy-
maker determines the in
ation rate in a specic period5. From equation (20), we show
5Considering in this analysis a policymaker with a short-run (a single period) horizon optimizing on
a period-by-period basis, we assume that the average in
ation rate is independent of the choice of the
in
ation rate and, therefore, the policymaker takes average in
ation rate as given when determines the
in
ation rate in a specic period. With an innite horizon, the planned sequence of in
ation would
aect the average in
ation rate, so that the policymaker has to take the impact on average in
ation into
account. However, the extension to an innite horizon is not crucial for the relevance of the results of
this single period model delivering basically the same qualitative results as the innite horizon model
(see, Jordan, 1999).
6that the the speed of disin
ation, s, is related to the degree of in
ation persistence,  ,
and consequently to the degree of central bank independence  and the degree of nominal
wage indexation 
.
Taking the rst derivative of (20) with respect to , we easily get @s = @ < 0. Then,
using the previous results (i.e.: @=@ < 0 and @=@





















Equation (21) states that a higher degree of CBI results in a higher speed of disin
ation.
This, in turn, should result in a smaller cost of disin
ation (i.e. a smaller sacrice ratio).
Equation (22) indicates that a higher degree of nominal wage indexation leads to faster,
and hence less costly, disin
ation.
As suggested by our analysis the speed of disin
ation is connected to the degree of
CBI. A higher degree of CBI leads to fast disin
ation. Consequently, this theoretical result
does not suggest, as it was, quite surprisingly, the case in previous analysis (see, Jordan,
1999), that a lower degree of CBI leads to fast disin
ation. In fact, it suggests exactly the
opposite and looks consistent with the main conclusions of the CBI literature. Actually,
as originally suggested by Sargent (1983), the speed of disin
ation is an indicator of
credibility because a speedier disin
ation is a visible sign of seriousness of the commitment
to disin
ating. And as CBI is an institutional mechanism through which the credibility of
policymakers can be enhanced, CBI should increase the speed of disin
ation. On the other
hand, nominal wage indexation is a factor that determine the in
ation-output trade-o
(or the slope of the short-run Phillips) but also the speed of disin
ation. In other words,
wage setters adjust more frequently their wage contracts and the economy move more
quickly to a new equilibrium with low in
ation by increasing the speed of disin
ation
and creating a potential gain in terms of output and unemployment. Consonant with the
Sargent (1983) view, and the Ball (1994) empirical ndings, a fast disin
ation (that is, a
high speed of disin
ation or a so-called \cold turkey" procedure) leads to smaller sacrice
ratios.
3 Empirical evidence
In this section, the theoretical insights suggested by the previous analysis are empirically
investigated. The main testable implication of the theory is that the in
ation persistence
(or the speed of disin
ation) is negatively (positively) aected by the degree of CBI
and the degree of nominal wage indexation. Another testable hypothesis is that the
disin
ations costs are negatively related to the in
ation persistence. In order to test the
robustness of these predictions, we need quantitative measures of the costs of disin
ation,
the in
ation persistence, the degree of CBI and nominal wage indexation. In this respect,
7our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 56 observations of disin
ation episodes for
18 OECD countries from 1960-906.
Dependent Variable: In
ation Persistence (INPA)











































Nobs 16 18 14 16 14 15
SEE 0:181 0:186 0:149 0:200 0:197 0:218
R2 0:409 0:283 0:632 0:214 0:355 0:142
Table 1: CBI, NWI and Average In
ation Persistence (INPA) over the 1960-1990 period
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. ,  and    = signicant at the 10, 5 and 1% level
Concerning the costs of disin
ation, the most commonly used measure is the sacrice
ratio which may be dened as the number of percentage points of lost output associated
with a policy-induced 1% reduction in in
ation. There are three common methods for
calculating this measure. The rst method, suggested by Ball (1994), involves the identi-
cation of actual periods of disin
ation for individual countries and then the calculation of
changes in the output gap relative to changes in in
ation over those periods. The second
method, oered by Hutchinson and Walsh (1998), consists of calculating sacrice ratios
for individual countries based on time-series estimates of short-run Phillips curves. The
third method, provided by Cecchetti and Rich (2001), construct sacrice ratio estimates
using three dierent structural VAR models. However, economists remain sceptical about
the ability of current econometric techniques to provide an accurate measurement of dis-
in
ation costs. In the following, we use the Ball's estimates of sacrice ratio issued by
the rst method. The simplicity of this method has the disadvantage that it does not
control for additional factors which may in
uence the output gap. However, this allows
us to performe regressions using sacrice ratio estimates for quite short time periods for
a relatively large number of countries. Table 6 in appendix gives estimates of sacrice
6The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. These are the same 18 countries examined, and for which CBI measures are generated, in
Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993) and in Cukierman (1992).
8Dependent Variable: In
ation Persistence (INPD)











































Nobs 50 56 43 49 43 46
SEE 0:181 0:179 0:179 0:188 0:187 0:189
R2 0:150 0:157 0:171 0:069 0:084 0:061
Table 2: CBI, NWI and In
ation Persistence over Disin
ationary episodes (INPD)
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. ,  and    = signicant at the 10, 5 and 1% level
ratio (SRB) for the 18 OECD countries of our sample over the 56 disin
ationary episodes
identied by Ball (1994).
The procedure adopted here to obtain in
ation persistence estimates, consists of cal-
culating in
ation persistence for individual countries based on time-series estimates of the
AR(1) process: t = a + bt 1 + ut , where the parameter b is an estimate of in
ation
persistence. The regressions are based on quarterly observations of consumer prices (CPI)
for the 18 OECD countries of our sample over the period 1960-1990 (see, OECD, Main
Economic Indicators). Three alternative indices of the in
ation persistence are provided.
The rst index is the IN
ation Persistence over Desin
ation episodes denoted by INPD,
and is obtained by performing regressions over the 56 disin
ationary episodes identied
by Ball (1994). The second index is the IN
ation Persistence on Average, denoted by
INPA. It re
ects the average degree of in
ation persistence over the whole period and is
obtained by performing regressions for each country over the period 1960-90. The third
index, denoted by INPM (IN
ation Persistence Mean), is obtained as the mean of the
degree of in
ation persistence constructed using the estimates for each country over the 56
disin
ation episodes. The second column of Table 6 shows the results of INPD estimates,
the third column gives estimates for INPA.
Finally, to test the in
uence of central bank independence (CBI) and the nominal wage
indexation (NWI) on the in
ation persistence, three alternative indices of CBI and two
indices of NWI are used. The rst index of CBI, denoted by LVAU, is the index for legal
independence developed by Cukierman [1992]. The second index, denoted by GMT, is the
total index of political and economic independence suggested by Grilli, Masciandaro and
9Dependent Variable: In
ation Persistence (INPA)











































Nobs 50 56 43 49 43 46
SEE 0:167 0:174 0:134 0:187 0:178 0:198
R2 0:405 0:272 0:639 0:201 0:369 0:158
Table 3: CBI, NWI and Average In
ation Persistence (INPA) over disin
ationary episodes
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. ,  and    = signicant at the 10, 5 and 1% level
Tabellini [1991]. The third index is the index, denoted by AS, is provided by Alesina and
Summers [1993]. The nominal wage indexation (NWI) is approximated by two alternative
proxies. The rst index, denoted by NWRE, is the Bruno and Sachs's [1985] index of
\nominal wage responsiveness". Higher values mean greater 
exibility, that is, shorter,
more indexed and more synchronized wage agreements. The second index, denoted by
NWRI, is the Grubb et alii (1983) index of \nominal wage rigidity" which is increasing
with nominal wage rigidity.
We start by testing the rst testable implication of our analysis. Tables 1, 2, 3 and
4 report regression results where the dependent variable is the in
ation persistence. The
three alternative indices of central bank independence (LVAU, AS and GMT) and the
two alternative indices of nominal wage indexation (NWRE and NWRI) are regressed,
respectively, on the three index of in
ation persistence (INPA, INPD and INPM). The
expected signs on the coecients are that greater CBI decreases the in
ation persistence,
the greater nominal wage responsiveness (NWRE) reduces in
ation persistence, and the
greater nominal wage rigidity (NWRI) increases the in
ation persistence. The key result
reported in these tables is consistent across all regressions and shows that the degree of
CBI has always a negative coecient. This negative coecient is statistically signicant
for most of the regressions performed. Moreover, the degre of NWRE (NWRI) has always
a negative (positive) coecient. These coecients also look statistically signicant in most
of the regressions. Therefore, these ndings support our two theoretical results according
to which CBI and NWI are negatively related to in
ation persistence. In particular,
these estimates provide a strong indication that countries whose central banks are more
10Dependent Variable: In
ation Persistence (INPM)











































Nobs 50 56 43 49 43 46
SEE 0:122 0:113 0:109 0:117 0:124 0:123
R2 0:278 0:320 0:355 0:160 0:174 0:134
Table 4: CBI, NWI and Mean In
ation Persistence (INPM) over disin
ationary episodes
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. ,  and    = signicant at the 10, 5 and 1% level
Dependent Variable: Sacrice Ratio




































Nobs 56 56 56 56 56 56
SEE 0:906 1:043 1:013 0:882 0:979 0:937
R2 0:272 0:036 0:090 0:324 0:167 0:237
Table 5: Sacrice Ratio and In
ation persistence
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. ,  and    = signicant at the 10, 5 and 1% level
11independent tend to nd their in
ation less persistent and disin
ation faster trough an
increase of the speed of disin
ation.
The second testable hypothesis of our analysis is the positive (negative) relationship
between the in
ation persistence (speed of disin
ation) and the size of the sacrice ratios.
The results of the performed regressions are reported in Table 5. In particular, the
three alternative indices of in
ation persistence (INPD, INPA and INPM) and the length
of the disin
ation episodes (LENGHT) issued by Ball's statistics are regressed on the
the sacrice ratio (SRB) which is the dependent variable. The key result is consistent
across all regressions. A lower in
ation persistence (a higher disin
ation speed) decreases
the costs of disin
ation. This result conrms the ndings in Ball (1994), where for a
given amount of disin
ation, a \cold turkey" procedure is more ecient than a gradual
disin
ation procedure. In addition, to further analyze our conclusion that CBI aects
the sacrice ratio through the disin
ation speed, we look at the impact of the CBI on
the in
ation persistence and thus on the speed of disin
ation. The results reported in
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show that the signs of the coecients for all indices of CBI are negative.
Therefore, there is an evidence that more independent central banks disin
ate faster and
with a lower output cost of disin
ation. This impact of central bank independence on
the sacrice ratio therefore comes entirely from a negative (positive) correlation between
the CBI and the in
ation persistence (speed of disin
ation). Finally, our results reveals
that the choice of the disin
ation procedure, between "gradualism" and "cold-turkey", is
not independent of the degree of central bank independence. These results contrast to
some extent with the empirical ndings of some previous studies, where more independent
central banks disin
ate more slowly and CBI is positively correlated to the sacrice ratios.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how CBI is associated with the output costs of disin
ation
through its in
uence on the in
ation persistence and thus on the speed of disin
ation.
Theoretically, a monetary game model is developed and predicts that a higher degree of
CBI leads to a a higher speed of disin
ation through its in
uence on the degree of in
ation
persistence.
The empirical results, based on a sample of 56 observations of disin
ation episodes
for 18 OECD countries, lead to the following main conclusions: CBI is negatively related
to the degree of in
ation persistence. There is a positive correlation between the degree
of in
ation persistence and the size of the sacrice ratios. Therefore, through the in
u-
ence on the speed of disin
ation, CBI is negatively related to the size of sacrice ratios.
Considering CBI as a possible determinant of cross-country dierences in the costs of
disin
ation, our results represent a new contribution to the literature, given the previous,
somewhat surprising, report a positive relationship between sacrice ratios and CBI.
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14Episode SRB INPD INPA Episode SRB INPD INPA
Australia Italy
1974-78 0:4665 0:410 0:596 1963-67 2:2857 0:407 0:794
1982-84 0:7571 0:312 0:596 1976-78 0:5107 0:315 0:794
1980-87 1:6448 0:777 0:794
Austria
1964-66  0:5019 0:218 0:229 Japan
1974-78 1:0824 0:396 0:229 1962-66  0:6262 0:295 0:393
1980-86 1:3120 0:144 0:229 1974-78 0:4615 0:465 0:393
1980-86  0:3842 0:225 0:393
Belgium
1965-67 0:7376 0:376 0:700 Netherlands
1974-78 0:4945 0:753 0:700 1965-67 1:2767 0:220 0:241
1982-87 1:7156 0:809 0:700 1975-78  0:8558 0:361 0:241
1980-86 0:8234 0:609 0:241
Canada
1969-70 0:9863 0:615 0:758 New-Zealand
1974-76 0:3822 0:523 0:758 1971-72 0:5396 0:587 0:664
1981-85 2:2261 0:856 0:758 1975-78 1:2897 0:653 0:664
1980-83 0:1752 0:455 0:664
Denmark 1982-88 0:1018 0:387 0:664
1968-69  0:6939 0:232 0:194
1974-76 0:5746 0:345 0:194 Spain
1980-85 1:7621 0:571 0:194 1962-63  0:5630 0:316 0:544
1964-69  0:2142 0:370 0:544
Finland 1977-87 3:4847 0:254 0:544
1964-65  0:3582 0:633 0:664
1967-69 0:9459 0:723 0:664 Sweden
1974-78 1:6569 0:758 0:664 1965-68 1:1134 0:254 0:311
1980-86 0:6477 0:669 0:664 1976-78 0:3564 0:472 0:311
1980-86 0:3357 0:322 0:311
France
1962-66  0:6765 0:343 0:823 Switzerland
1974-77 1:0807 0:539 0:823 1966-68 1:6060 0:544 0:483
1981-86 0:2517 0:868 0:823 1974-76 1:3447 0:547 0:483
1981-83 1:2618 0:362 0:483
Germany 1984-86  0:7917 0:361 0:483
1965-67 1:5614 0:386 0:399
1974-77 3:1974 0:437 0:399 U.K.
1980-86 2:0739 0:622 0:399 1961-63 1:7717 0:652 0:577
1975-78  0:0682 0:380 0:577
Ireland 1980-86 1:0202 0:379 0:577
1964-66 0:9134 0:462 0:508
1974-78 0:8147 0:193 0:508 U.S.A.
1981-87 0:4292 0:597 0:508 1969-71 3:3666 0:807 0:812
1974-76 1:6057 0:638 0:812
1979-85 1:9362 0:782 0:812
Table 6: Disin
ation Episodes for Various Countries and In
ation Persistence
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